Not very long ago, the prospect of a sale would have been unthinkable. For 127 years, Whitney National Bank and its iconic symbol, a stately clock mounted at the building’s corner, have been fixtures in downtown New Orleans. Through many decades the bank touted itself as one of the oldest and most stable banks in Louisiana and one of the few in the country to survive the Great Depression. Conservative banking, financial endurance and “the Whitney” were billed as one and the same.
Yet, when word broke late last year that Gulfport, Miss.-based Hancock Holding Co. planned to acquire the $11 billion Whitney, the news drew nary a gasp. Bankers, in fact, had been trading bets on who might buy Whitney and when.
Whitney had big loan problems, and everybody knew it. The bank had received—and not yet repaid—$300 million from the federal government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program and slashed its longstanding shareholder dividend to a penny. Federal regulators last year ordered Whitney to fix a number of faulty internal practices.
Now, Louisiana’s largest remaining bank was about to change hands, and nobody seemed to care.
Along with public awareness of the bank’s troubles, also eclipsing the merger news was a rumor that another company had bid on Whitney before Hancock swooped in. Surprisingly, the rumored bidder was not an out-of-state institution, but a homegrown corridor bank that has been flexing its muscle from its base in Cajun country.
Lafayette-based IberiaBank Corp. has gobbled up more than a dozen institutions in several states during the last eight years on its way to becoming a $10 billion bank. The company established a New Orleans presence in the late ’90s, and many expected it would enlarge its footprint in the Crescent City over time. But how many would have predicted an IberiaBank move on Whitney?
Baton Rouge banking consultant William Staats says very little is surprising in the south Louisiana banking landscape these days. “Who would have thought that a good, blue-blooded bank like Whitney would develop credit problems?” he says.
MERGER MANIA
Like bankers, consumers have learned to take bank mergers in stride. At one time, the announcement of a local bank being sold would have set its customers to fretting over whether checks they had recently written would bounce. Today, most consumers accept mergers as commonplace. As Hancock’s purchase of Whitney awaits shareholder and regulatory approvals, public concerns likely will focus less on checking accounts than on whether the new owner will uphold Whitney’s philanthropic commitments in Louisiana.
Hancock Holding CEO Carl Chaney offered some reassurance when he announced that the Whitney name will remain on its offices in Louisiana and Texas after the merger and that current Whitney Chief Risk Officer Joseph Exnicios will become president of the Louisiana-Texas franchise.
That the 112-year-old Hancock is on the verge of such a big acquisition speaks to its strength in the rough-and-tumble arena of “regionals,” a crop of mid-size institutions that came to occupy the space between community banks and the giant, nationwide financial institutions like Capital One. As the latter grew ever larger during the last few decades, the regional banks duked it out among themselves.
Several regionals—Hancock, AmSouth, Union Planters and Regions banks—gained a foothold in south Louisiana, but mergers thinned their ranks. Birmingham, Ala.-based Regions absorbed Union Planters in 2005 and took over AmSouth a year later. Regions remains active in Louisiana, but it is plagued by troubled real estate loans and has yet to repay $3.5 billion in TARP funds.
Meanwhile, undaunted by the Hancock-Whitney deal, IberiaBank continues trotting down the merger trail. In the past few months, President and CEO Daryl Byrd announced planned purchases of both Omni Bank in New Orleans and Cameron State Bank in Lake Charles. Once those deals are done—and assuming the Hancock-Whitney merger proceeds—IberiaBank will become the largest bank headquartered in Louisiana.
The picture is a sea change from just 15 years ago, when Louisiana’s bank list was topped by Hibernia National Bank, Premier Bank, First National Bank of Commerce and Whitney. New Orleans-based Hibernia—which racked up a slew of loan problems in the 1990s—became part of Capital One in 2006. Both Premier Bank in Baton Rouge and First National Bank of Commerce in New Orleans were absorbed into Bank One, which was subsequently merged into JPMorgan Chase Bank in 2004.
The state’s largest banking names and dozens of its smaller ones are rapidly taking their place in Louisiana’s financial history, leaving some veteran bankers shaking their heads.
“I never thought I’d see Whitney, Hibernia and First National Bank of Commerce merged out of existence,” says C.R. “Rusty” Cloutier, president and CEO of MidSouth Bancorp Inc. in Lafayette.
RISKY BUSINESS
What brought the banking industry to this juncture was a host of changes produced by economic, political and regulatory pressures over a period of years. As a starting point, one could look to the collapse of the nation’s savings and loan industry, though many bankers would start further back, with the 1970s federal deregulation of interest rates. With S&Ls suddenly allowed to pay higher rates on deposits than ever before, money flooded in. Flush with cash, many thrifts made wildly careless decisions about how to deploy the funds—with devastating results.
When oil went bust in the early 1980s and real estate values tumbled, hundreds of S&Ls sank under mountains of soured mortgages. The industry went into a free fall, particularly in oil states such as Louisiana, Texas and Oklahoma. Very few institutions survived.
A fair number of commercial banks also succumbed, as federal insurers struggled to gain control over the crisis. The feds poured billions of dollars into cleaning up the loan mess. Their favorite method was to encourage healthy banking institutions to take over the assets of failed S&Ls through “assisted” transactions that limited the buyer’s risk. Banks that successfully managed these new assets and integrated them into existing operations began to see the cost benefits of growing through acquisition. Thus began an era of consolidation that not only wiped most S&Ls off the map, but also slashed the number of commercial banks operating across the country.
More than 150 Louisiana S&Ls collapsed during the 1980s debacle after racking up almost $5 billion in losses. Fully a third of the state’s 302 federally insured commercial banks vanished in closures or mergers during the period.
After the crisis, the consolidation continued, with mergers among “healthy” institutions becoming routine. Today, only 132 banks call Louisiana home, with 63 based in the corridor region.
Staats, who teaches at the Graduate School of Banking at Louisiana State University, says the 1980s provided a tutorial on bad lending practices. “Many institutions grew too fast for the sake of growing and didn’t develop teams sufficient to manage the credits.” Their legacy, he says, is a simple lesson: “The chickens always come home to roost.”
SHORT MEMORIES
Even simple lessons don’t necessarily stick. Though bank regulators typically tighten lending standards during a crisis, economic growth always loosens them up again. By 1999, Congress had left the S&L fiasco in its rear-view mirror and once again had the deregulation itch. The result was the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act.
For more than 60 years the law had effectively separated activities of depository institutions from those of Wall Street investment banks. Now, with the barrier removed, the nation’s biggest banking companies, such as Citigroup, were free to “securitize” various types of credits, creating, for instance, tradable securities backed by large quantities of home mortgages or other debt.
In no time, the nation’s credit issuers set new records for handing out easy money. With the giant banks offering credit as though it would soon go out of style, a cadre of mortgage lenders appeared from nowhere, happy to approve home loans and sell them off to investors before the ink on the documents was dry. Mortgage lending rose off the charts; credit card debt soared.
Easy credit boosted the pace of real estate sales around the country, and as certain markets turned hot, smaller banks, too, began chasing the action. In south Louisiana, where real estate values were strong but not sizzling, some bankers reached for the gold elsewhere.
Perhaps it wasn’t surprising that a young institution such as the $240 million-asset Statewide Bank in Covington took the bait. Statewide’s risky lending to real estate developers and its investments in mortgage-backed securities buried the institution in losses. Regulators closed it down in 2010, making it the first Louisiana bank failure in seven years. They brokered a deal for Home Bancorp Inc. of Lafayette, parent company of Home Bank, to take over most of its assets.
The more startling evidence that bankers memories are short came from conservative stalwart Whitney. Since the mid-1990s, Whitney had been acquiring banks along the Gulf Coast, ultimately gathering a half-dozen Florida institutions under its wing. When the mortgage crisis erupted and slammed Florida real estate, Whitney took a body blow. Despite an injection of TARP funds, the company did not bounce back. The situation undoubtedly made the board’s decision to sell the bank easier.
REGULATORY DISGRACE
For community bankers like Cloutier, who launched MidSouth Bank in 1985, events of the last few decades are evidence of a federal disregard for consumer interests. During his banking career Cloutier has sat on advisory committees to the Federal Reserve Bank and Fannie Mae and chaired the Independent Community Bankers of America. He had a close-up view as the country’s biggest financial institutions grew from multibillion-dollar institutions into trillion-dollar firms.
“Over and over the federal government has passed rules and regulations that are all about taking care of the Big Boys,” he says.
His anger over the perceived unfairness led Cloutier in 2009 to write a book railing against the “pure greed and ego” of leaders of the nation’s biggest banks. He complains that the megabanks took foolish risks that have cost U.S. taxpayers billions. Just as bad, he says, Congress reacted to the latest credit crisis by laying onerous new regulations on all commercial banks—not just the big ones.
New requirements for public disclosure of certain credit practices and lending policies may sound good in terms of improving communication, Cloutier says, but if complying with such rules adds burdensome costs, who benefits?
“I’d like to see a lot of the regulations taken off the books,” he says. “I think the consumer is the one that’s losing here in the long run.”
New Orleans investment banker and mergers specialist Sherwood “Woody” Briggs offers a similar view. He says it’s one thing to slap layers of rules on a company like Bank of America or Citigroup, which have legions of lawyers and compliance officers on board to manage the job. It’s a different matter when regulators pile so many requirements on small institutions that they have to expand their payroll to handle it.
“I know of an extremely small bank that had to add a person to its tiny staff just to comply with all this,” Briggs says. “Community banks have a hard time competing, and it’s a disgrace that they’ve been cast in the same lot with the big banks.”
THE SMALL GET BIGGER
In time, the mounting layers of regulation could have the effect of making community
banks larger. Already, thanks to growth and consolidation trends, the upper threshold considered to define a community bank has climbed out of the millions and into the billions.
“Today, with the biggest banks being $2 trillion companies, a $10 billion bank is tiny,” says New Orleans banker Ashton Ryan.
The former CEO of First National Bank of Commerce and subsequent Louisiana vice chairman of its acquirer, Bank One, Ryan in 2006 got a hankering to start from scratch. He launched one of the few de novo, or newly chartered, banks to open in Louisiana in this decade. Ryan raised $60 million to capitalize the company—dubbed First NBC Bank to reflect his banking roots—then rapidly built it to $1.5 billion in assets.
While many bankers these days complain of soft loan demand, Ryan says First NBC Bank is finding plenty of business in New Orleans, thanks in part to the ongoing post-Katrina recovery. “There’s a lot of good activity in the city,” he says.
The bank also benefits from the longtime relationships developed previously by its staff. Not only did Ryan pointedly name his new bank after the well-reputed First National Bank of Commerce, but he also brought many alumni of that bank into the new operation. “My bank is full of First Commerce people,” he says.
As he focuses on building First NBC Bank, Ryan says he welcomes the expansion of IberiaBank and Hancock in the New Orleans market.
“I firmly believe this city needs a number of different banks out there lending money,” he says. “Both of those banks got into the market initially by buying failed or troubled banks or branches. As a result, neither had a tremendous base here.”
Now, the Whitney acquisition will boost Hancock’s base by $11 billion, and the Omni purchase will solidify IberiaBank’s New Orleans footprint. “This is a good opportunity for growth, and I believe it will be good for the city,” Ryan says. After Ryan spoke with 10/12, Lafayette-based Home Bancorp also moved to strengthen its New Orleans position, acquiring GS Financial Corp., owner of Metairie-based Guaranty Savings Bank.
As for competing with national outfits Capital One and JPMorgan Chase, which currently claim 23% and 21%, respectively, of corridor bank deposits, Ryan says the big banks are not primary sources for small-business borrowers anyhow. “Small businesses get capital to grow from the community banking system,” he says.
When it comes to developing relationships with their customers, he adds, “Nobody in the big-bank world even kids you anymore that they’re going to give you personal service.”
HEAD TO HEAD
The prospect of Ryan’s fledgling bank competing with the larger IberiaBank, headed by a former colleague, sets up an interesting rivalry. Like Ryan, Byrd has populated IberiaBank with a goodly number of First Commerce alumni who worked under that company’s now-retired former chairman, Ian Arnof. Both CEOs speak highly of their former boss.
“Ian was a very disciplined person, and what I learned there was to run a balanced and disciplined company,” Byrd says.
One area where he aims to improve on the First Commerce experience relates to teamwork. “We focus on it and talk about it a lot.” In fact, he says: “You can get thrown out of this company if you’re not a good team player.”
Byrd, a South Carolina native who began his banking career in Atlanta, says he has no memory lapse when it comes to past financial crises. He joined First Commerce in 1985, right in the thick of the S&L mess.
“I had just turned 30,” he says. “I was a young pup, and First Commerce brought me into their Lafayette bank as a senior lender at a time when things were getting real ugly, real fast.”
Byrd says the lessons were priceless. “I tell people that having been through that cycle is one of the things that’s helped us get through this cycle.”
The experience made Byrd a staunch proponent of minimizing risk by diversifying both geographically and in lending. “Don’t put too many eggs in one basket,” is his mantra. He notes, for instance, that before Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, close to 85% of IberiaBank’s assets were in south Louisiana. Anxious to correct the imbalance, Byrd plotted the bank’s entry into Arkansas.
Tulane University business professor Peter Richiutti, who heads the public company research program Burkenroad Reports, considers Byrd’s 2007 move inspired. “While everybody else pushed off to the Florida panhandle and the coast, Iberia didn’t do that. They went into Arkansas instead, and that just changed everything,” he says.
Richiutti gives Byrd additional points for putting former First Commerce executive Michael Brown in charge of building up the Arkansas franchise. “While they did all that, the real estate market collapsed in Florida,” Richiutti says.
While IberiaBank, too, has moved into Florida, mainly by acquiring assets of failed institutions with federal help, Byrd says his broad strategy is to keep a lid on real estate lending. He says he’ll concentrate on small-business and middle-market borrowers in the commercial and industrial sectors.
“Look at the number of banks in the last 10 years that have lived solely on real estate lending,” he says. “When you realize the amount of inventory we’ve got and the amount of regulatory changes we’ve got, you can’t live on that asset class.”
Bank mergers specialist Briggs likes the prospects for both IberiaBank and Hancock Bank, post-Whitney acquisition. He calls IberiaBank “an incipient powerhouse” that’s well on its way to becoming a $20 billion bank, and he expects to see both Iberia and Hancock shopping for Louisiana acquisition targets in the range of $500 million to $1.25 billion in assets.
Byrd won’t comment about targets that may be in his sights, but he offers a hint of what’s to come when he says: “I think you’re going to see a huge amount of consolidation in our business over the next three years.”
As to whether IberiaBank itself will eventually become a target of one of the larger players, Byrd says his goal is simply to develop banking talent and build value that give the company long-range staying power. “If you have the right talent and you are expensive, then you’ve earned the right to be independent,” he says.
